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Abstract. Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the
multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph represent-
ing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the
member with the highest number of nominations. This seemingly trivial goal be-
comes challenging when there is an additional impartiality constraint, requiring
that no single member can influence her chance of being selected. Recent progress
has identified impartial selection rules with optimal approximation ratios. More-
over, it was noted that worst-case instances are graphs with few vertices. Moti-
vated by this fact, we propose the study of additive approximation, the difference
between the highest number of nominations and the number of nominations of the
selected member, as an alternative measure of the quality of impartial selection.
Our positive results include two randomized impartial selection mechanisms which
have additive approximation guarantees of Θ(
√
n) and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n) for the
two most studied models in the literature, where n denotes the community size.
We complement our positive results by providing negative results for various
cases. First, we provide a characterization for the interesting class of strong sam-
ple mechanisms, which allows us to obtain lower bounds of n−2, and ofΩ(√n)
for their deterministic and randomized variants respectively. Finally, we present
a general lower bound of 2 for all deterministic impartial mechanisms.
Keywords: impartial selection · voting · mechanism design
1 Introduction
We study the problem that arises in a community of individuals that want to select a
community member that will receive an award. This is a standard social choice prob-
lem [7], that is typically encountered in scientific and sports communities but has also
found important applications in distributed multi-agent systems. To give an entertaining
example, the award for the player of the year3 by the Professional Footballers Associa-
tion (PFA) is decided by the members of PFA themselves; each PFA member votes the
two players they consider the best for the award and the player with the maximum num-
ber of votes receives the award. Footballers consider it as one of the most prestigious
awards, due to the fact that it is decided by their opponents. In distributed multi-agent
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PFA Players%27 Player of the Year
2 I. Caragiannis et al.
systems, leader election (e.g., see [2]) can be thought of as a selection problem of simi-
lar flavor. Other notable examples include (see [10]) the selection of a representative in
a group, funding decisions based on peer reviewing or even (see [1]) finding the most
popular user of a social network.
The input of the problem can be represented as a directed graph, which we usually
call nomination profile. Each vertex represents an individual and a direct edge indicates
a vote (or nomination) by a community member to another.
A selection mechanism (or selection rule) takes a nomination profile as input and
returns a single vertex as the winner. Clearly, there is a highly desirable selection rule:
the one which always returns the highest in-degree vertex as the winner. Unfortunately,
such a rule suffers from a drawback that is pervasive in social choice. Namely, it is
susceptible to manipulation.
In particular, the important constraint that makes the selection challenging is impar-
tiality. As every individual has a personal interest to receive the award, selection rules
should take the individual votes into account but in such a way that no single individual
can increase his/her chance of winning by changing his/her vote. The problem, known
as impartial selection, was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin [11] and
Alon et al. [1]. Unfortunately, the ideal selection rule mentioned above is not impartial.
Consider the case with a few individuals that are tied with the highest number of votes.
The agents involved in the tie might be tempted to lie about their true preferences to
break the tie in their favor.
Impartial selection rules may inevitably select as the winner a vertex that does
not have the maximum in-degree. Moulin and Holzman [11] considered minimum ax-
iomatic properties that impartial selection rules should satisfy. For example, a highly
desirable property, called negative unanimity, requires that an individual with no votes
at all, should never be selected. Alon et al. [1] quantified the efficiency loss with the
notion of approximation ratio, defined as the worst-case ratio of the maximum vertex
in-degree over the in-degree of the vertex which is selected by the rule. According to
their definition, an impartial selection rule should have as low approximation ratio as
possible. This line of research was concluded by the work of Fischer and Klimm [10]
who proposed impartial mechanisms with the optimal approximation ratio of 2.
It was pointed out in [1,10], that the most challenging nomination profiles for both
deterministic and randomized mechanisms are those with small in-degrees. In the case
of deterministic mechanisms, the situation is quite extreme as all deterministic mech-
anisms can be easily seen to have an unbounded approximation ratio on inputs with a
maximum in-degree of 1 for a single vertex and 0 for all others; see [1] for a concrete
example. As a result, the approximation ratio does not seem to be an appropriate mea-
sure to classify deterministic selection mechanisms. Finally, Bousquet et al. [6] have
shown that if the maximum in-degree is large enough, randomized mechanisms that
return a near optimal impartial winner do exist.
We deviate from previous work and instead propose to use additive approximation
as a measure of the quality of impartial selection rules. Additive approximation is de-
fined using the difference between the maximum in-degree and the in-degree of the
winner returned by the selection mechanism. Note that deterministic mechanisms with
low additive approximation always return the highest in-degree vertex as the winner
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when his/her margin of victory is large. When this does not happen, we have a guaran-
tee that the winner returned by the mechanism has a close-to-maximum in-degree.
Our contribution. We provide positive and negative results for impartial selection mech-
anisms with additive approximation guarantees. We distinguish between two models. In
the first model, which was considered by Holzman and Moulin [11], nomination profiles
consist only of graphs with all vertices having an out-degree of 1. The second model is
more general and allows for multiple nominations and abstentions (hence, vertices have
arbitrary out-degrees).
As positive results, we present two randomized impartial mechanisms which have
additive approximation guarantees of Θ(
√
n) and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n) for the single nom-
ination and multiple nomination models, respectively. Notice that both these additive
guarantees are o(n) functions of the number n of vertices. We remark that an o(n)-
additive approximation guarantee can be translated to an 1−  multiplicative guarantee
for graphs with sufficiently large maximum in-degree, similar to the results of [6]. Con-
versely, the multiplicative guarantees of [6] can be translated to an O(n8/9)-additive
guarantee4. This analysis further demonstrates that additive guarantees allow for a more
smooth classification of mechanisms that achieve good multiplicative approximation in
the limit.
Our mechanisms first select a small sample of vertices, and then select the winner
among the vertices that are nominated by the sample vertices. These mechanisms are
randomized variants of a class of mechanisms which we define and call strong sample
mechanisms. Strong sample mechanisms are deterministic impartial mechanisms which
select the winner among the vertices nominated by a sample set of vertices. In addition,
they have the characteristic that the sample set does not change with changes in the
nominations of the vertices belonging to it. For the single nomination model, we provide
a characterization, and we show that all these mechanisms should use a fixed sample
set that does not depend on the nomination profile. This yields a n− 2 lower bound on
the additive approximation guarantee of any deterministic strong sample mechanism.
For randomized variants, where the sample set is selected randomly, we present an
Ω(
√
n) lower bound which indicates that our first randomized impartial mechanism
is best possible among all randomized variants of strong sample mechanisms. Finally,
for the most general multiple nomination model, we present a lower bound of 2 for all
deterministic mechanisms.
Due to space limitations some proofs are omitted. The reader is referred to the full
version of the paper.
Related work. Besides the papers by Holzman and Moulin [11] and Alon et al. [1],
which introduced impartial selection as we study it here, de Clippel et al. [9] consid-
ered a different version with a divisible award. Alon et al. [1] used the approximation
ratio as a measure of quality for impartial selection mechanisms. After realizing that
no deterministic mechanism achieves a bounded approximation ratio, they focused on
randomized mechanisms and proposed the 2-PARTITION mechanism, which guarantees
4 The authors in [6] do not provide additive guarantees, hence we based our calculations on their
provided bounds on the multiplicative guarantee 1−. It is important to note however that they
claim that they have not optimized their parameters, so it is possible that this guarantee can be
further reduced by a tighter analysis.
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an approximation ratio of 4 and complemented this positive result with a lower bound
of 2 for randomized mechanisms.
Later, Fischer and Klimm were able to design a mechanism that achieves an ap-
proximation ratio of 2, by generalizing 2-PARTITION. Their optimal mechanism, called
PERMUTATION, examines the vertices sequentially following their order in a random
permutation and selects as the winner the vertex of highest degree counting only edges
with direction from “left” to “right.” They also provided lower bounds on the approx-
imation ratio for restricted inputs (e.g., with no abstentions) and have shown that the
worst case examples for the approximation ratio are tight when the input nomination
profiles are small.
Bousquet et al. in [6] noticed this bias towards instances with small in-degrees and
examined the problem for instances of very high maximum in-degree. After showing
that PERMUTATION performs significantly better for instances of high in-degree, they
have designed the SLICING mechanism with near optimal asymptotic behaviour for that
restricted family of graphs. More precisely, they have shown that, if the maximum in-
degree is large enough, SLICING can guarantee that the winner’s in-degree approximate
the maximum in-degree by a small error. As we discussed in the previous section, the
SLICING mechanism can achieve an additive guarantee of O(n8/9).
Holzman and Moulin [11] explore impartial mechanisms through an axiomatic ap-
proach. They investigate the single nomination model and propose several deterministic
mechanisms, including their MAJORITY WITH DEFAULT rule. MAJORITY WITH DE-
FAULT defines a vertex as a default winner and examines if there is any vertex with
in-degree more than dn/2e, ignoring the edge from the default vertex. If such a vertex
exists, then this is the winner; otherwise the default vertex wins. While this mechanism
has the unpleasant property that the default vertex may become the winner with no in-
coming edges at all, its additive approximation is at most dn/2e. Further to that, they
came up with a fundamental limitation of the problem: no impartial selection mecha-
nism can be simultaneously negative and positive unanimous (i.e., never selecting as
a winner a vertex of in-degree 0 and always selecting the vertex of in-degree n − 1,
whenever there exists one).
Mackenzie in [14] characterized symmetric (i.e., name-independent) rules in the
single nomination model. Tamura and Ohseto [16] observed that when the demand for
only one winner is relaxed, then impartial, negative unanimous and positive unanimous
mechanisms do exist. Later on, Tamura [15] characterized them. On the same agenda,
Bjelde et al. in [5] proposed a deterministic version of the permutation mechanism that
achieves the 1/2 bound by allowing at most two winners. Alon et al. [1] also present
results for selecting multiple winners.
Finally, we remark that impartiality has been investigated as a desired property in
other contexts where strategic behaviour occurs. Recent examples include peer review-
ing [3,12,13], selecting impartially the most influential vertex in a network [4], linear
regression algorithms as a means to tackle strategic noise [8], and more.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of n ≥ 2 agents. A nomination graph G = (N,E)
is a directed graph with vertices representing the agents. The set of outgoing edges
from each vertex represents the nominations of each agent; it contains no self-loops (as,
agents are not allowed to nominate themselves) and can be empty (as an agent is, in
general, allowed to abstain). We write G = Gn for the set of all graphs with n vertices
and no self-loops. We also use the notation G1 = G1n to denote the subset of G with out-
degree exactly 1. For convenience in the proofs, we sometimes denote each graphG by a
tuple x, called nomination profile, where xu denotes the set of outgoing edges of vertex
u in G. For u ∈ N , we use the notation x−u to denote the graph (N,E \ ({u} ×N))
and, for the set of vertices U ⊆ N , we use x−U to denote the graph (N,E \ (U ×N)).
We use the terms nomination graphs and nomination profiles interchangeably.
The notation δS(u,x) refers to the in-degree of vertex u in the graph x taking into
account only edges that originate from the subset S ⊆ N . When S = N , we use
the shorthand δ(u,x) and if the graph is clearly identified by the context we omit
x too, using δ(u). We denote the maximum in-degree vertex of graph x as ∆(x) =
maxu∈N δ(u,x) and, whenever x is clear from the context, we use ∆ instead.
5. f is not defined without g. Hence, it is ambiguous to use f(x) in isolation. A
selection mechanism for a set of graphs G′ ⊆ G, is a function f : G′ → [0, 1]n+1,
mapping each graph of G′ to a probability distribution over all vertices (which can be
potential winners) as well as to the possibility of returning no winner at all. A selection
mechanism is deterministic in the special case where for all x, (f(x))u ∈ {0, 1} for all
vertices u ∈ N .
A selection mechanism is impartial if for all graphs x ∈ G′, it holds (f(x))u =
(f(x′u,x−u))u for every vertex u. In words, the probability that u wins must be inde-
pendent of the set of its outgoing edges. Let E [ δ(f(x)) ] be the expected in-degree of
f on x, i.e. E [ δ(f(x)) ] =
∑
u∈N (f(x))uδ(u,x). We call f α(n)-additive if
max
x∈Gn
{∆(x)− E [ δ(f(x) ]} ≤ α(n),
for every n ∈ N.
3 Upper Bounds
In this section we provide randomized selection mechanisms for the two best studied
models in the literature. First, in Section 3.1 we propose a mechanism for the single
nomination model of Holzman and Moulin [11], where nomination profiles consist only
of graphs with all vertices having an out-degree of 1. Then, in Section 3.2 we provide
a mechanism for the more general model studied by Alon et al. [1], which allows for
multiple nominations and abstentions.
3.1 The RANDOM k-SAMPLE Mechanism
Our first mechanism, RANDOM k-SAMPLE, forms a sample S of vertices by repeating
k times the selection of a vertex uniformly at random with replacement. Any vertex that
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is selected at least once belongs to the sample S. LetW := {u ∈ N \S : δS(u,x) ≥ 1}
be the set of vertices outside S that are nominated by the vertices of S. If W = ∅, no
winner is returned. Otherwise, the winner is a vertex in argmaxu∈W δN\W (u,x). We
note here the crucial fact that the selection of the sample set S is independent of the
nomination profile x.
Impartiality follows since a vertex that does not belong to W (no matter if it be-
longs to S or not) cannot become the winner and the nominations of vertices in W are
not taken into account for deciding the winner among them. We now argue that, for a
carefully selected k, this mechanism also achieves a good additive guarantee.
Theorem 1. For k = Θ(
√
n), the RANDOM k-SAMPLE mechanism is impartial and
Θ(
√
n)-additive in the single nomination model.
Proof. Consider a nomination graph and let u∗ be a vertex of maximum in-degree ∆.
In our proof of the approximation guarantee, we will use the following two technical
lemmas.
Lemma 1. If u∗ ∈W , then the winner has in-degree at least ∆− k.
Proof. This is clearly true if the winner returned by RANDOM k-SAMPLE is u∗. Other-
wise, the winner w satisfies
δ(w,x) ≥ δN\W (w,x) ≥ δN\W (u∗,x) = δ(u∗,x)− δW (u∗,x) ≥ ∆− k.
The first inequality is trivial. The second inequality follows by the definition of the
winner w. The third inequality follows since W is created by nominations of vertices in
S, taking into account that each vertex has out-degree exactly 1. Hence, δW (u∗,x) ≤
|W | ≤ |S| ≤ k. uunionsq
Lemma 2. The probability that u∗ belongs to the nominated set W is
Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] =
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− 1
n
)k
.
Proof. Indeed, u∗ belongs to W if it does not belong to the sample S and instead some
of the ∆ vertices that nominate u∗ is picked in some of the k vertex selections. The
probability that u∗ is not in the sample is
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ] =
(
1− 1
n
)k
, (1)
i.e., the probability that vertex u∗ is not picked in some of the k vertex selections.
Observe that the probability that some of the ∆ vertices that nominate u∗ is picked in a
vertex selection step assuming that u∗ is never selected is ∆n−1 . Hence, the probability
that some of the ∆ vertices nominating u∗ is in the sample assuming that u∗ 6∈ S is
Pr [ δS(u
∗,x) ≥ 1|u∗ 6∈ S ] = 1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k
. (2)
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The lemma follows by the chain rule
Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] = Pr [ u∗ 6= S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≥ 1 ]
= Pr [ δS(u
∗,x) ≥ 1|u∗ 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ]
and equations (1) and (2). uunionsq
By Lemmas 1 and 2, we have that the expected degree of the winner returned by
mechanism RANDOM k-SAMPLE is
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ Pr [ u∗ ∈W ] · (∆− k) =
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− 1
n
)k
(∆− k)
≥
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)(
1− k
n
)
(∆− k) >
(
1−
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k)
(∆− 2k)
= ∆− 2k −
(
1− ∆
n− 1
)k
(∆− 2k)
The second inequality follows by Bernoulli’s inequality (1 + x)r ≥ 1 + rx for ev-
ery real x ≥ −1 and r ≥ 0 and the third one since n > ∆. Now, the quantity(
1− ∆n−1
)k
(∆− 2k) is maximized for ∆ = n−1+2k2k+1 to a value that is at most
n+1
k+1 − 2. Hence,
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆− 2(k − 1)− n+ 1
k + 1
.
By setting k ∈ Θ(√n), we obtain that E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆−Θ(√n), as desired. uunionsq
3.2 The SIMPLE k-SAMPLE Mechanism
In the most general model, we have the randomized mechanism SIMPLE k-SAMPLE,
which is even simpler than RANDOM k-SAMPLE. Again, SIMPLE k-SAMPLE forms a
sample S of vertices by repeating k times the selection of a vertex uniformly at random
with replacement. The winner (if any) is a vertex w in argmaxu∈N\S δS(u,x). We
remark that, for technical reasons, we allow S to be a multi-set if the same vertex is
selected more than once. Then, edge multiplicities are counted in δS(u,x). Clearly,
SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is impartial. The winner is decided by the vertices in S, which in
turn have no chance to become winners. Our approximation guarantee is slightly weaker
now.
Theorem 2. For k =
⌈
41/3n2/3 ln1/3 n
⌉
, mechanism SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is impartial
and Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n)-additive.
Proof. Let u∗ be a vertex of maximum in-degree ∆. If ∆ ≤ k, SIMPLE k-SAMPLE is
clearly Θ(n2/3 ln1/3 n)-additive. So, in the following, we assume that ∆ > k. Let C
be the set of vertices of in-degree at most ∆− k − 1. We first show that the probability
8 I. Caragiannis et al.
Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ] that some vertex of C is returned as the winner by SIMPLE
k-SAMPLE is small.
Notice that if some of the vertices ofC is the winner, then either vertex u∗ belongs to
to the sample set S or it does not belongs to S but it gets the same or fewer nominations
compared to some vertex u of C. Hence,
Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ]
≤ Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x) for some u ∈ C s.t. u 6∈ S ]
≤ Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ∧ u 6∈ S ∧ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x) ]
= Pr [ u∗ ∈ S ] +
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗, u 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ] (3)
We will now bound the rightmost probability in (3). The proof of Claim 1 appears in
the full version of the paper.
Claim 1. For every u ∈ C,Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗ 6∈ S, u 6∈ S ] ≤ exp
(
− k32n2
)
.
Using the definition of E [ δ(w,x) ], inequality (3), and Claim 1, we obtain
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ (∆− k) · (1−Pr [ δ(w,x) ≤ ∆− k − 1 ])
≥ (∆− k)
(
Pr [ u∗ 6∈ S ]−
∑
u∈C
Pr [ u∗, u 6∈ S ] ·Pr [ δS(u∗,x) ≤ δS(u,x)|u∗, u 6∈ S ]
)
≥ (∆− k)
(
1− 1
n
)k
− (∆− k)
(∑
u∈C
(
1− 2
n
)k
· exp
(
− k
3
2n2
))
≥ (∆− k)
(
1− k
n
)
− (∆− k) · n · exp
(
− k
3
2n2
)
≥ ∆− 2k − n2 · exp
(
− k
3
2n2
)
. (4)
The last inequality follows since n ≥ ∆. Setting k =
⌈
41/3n2/3 ln1/3 n
⌉
, (4) yields
E [ δ(w,x) ] ≥ ∆−Θ
(
n2/3 ln1/3 n
)
, as desired. uunionsq
4 Lower Bounds
In this section we complement our positive results by providing impossibility results.
First, in Section 4.1, we provide lower bounds for a class of mechanisms which we call
strong sample mechanisms, in the single nomination model of Holzman and Moulin [11].
Then, in Section 4.2, we provide a lower bound for the most general model of Alon et
al. [1], which applies to any deterministic mechanism.
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4.1 Strong Sample Mechanisms
In this section, we give a characterization theorem for a class of impartial mecha-
nisms which we call strong sample mechanisms. We then use this characterization to
provide lower bounds on the additive approximation of deterministic and randomized
mechanisms that belong to this class. Our results suggest that mechanism RANDOM
k-SAMPLE from Section 3.1 is essentially the best possible randomized mechanism in
this class.
For a graph G ∈ G1 and a subset of vertices S, let W := WS(G) be the set
of vertices outside S nominated by S, i.e. W = {w ∈ N \ S : (v, w) ∈ E, v ∈
S}. A sample mechanism5 (g, f) firstly selects a subset S using some function g :
G1 → P(N) \ ∅, and then applies a (possibly randomized) selection mechanism f by
restricting its range on vertices inW ; notice that ifW = ∅, f does not select any vertex.
We say that the mechanism is randomized if g uses randomization in the selection of S,
otherwise it is deterministic (even if f uses randomization).
This definition allows for a large class of impartial mechanisms. For example, the
special case of sample mechanisms with |S| = 1 (in which, the winner has in-degree
at least 1), coincides with all negative unanimous mechanisms defined by Holzman
and Moulin [11]. Indeed, when |S| = 1, the set W in never empty and the winner
has in-degree at least 1. This is not however the case for |S| > 1, where W could be
empty when all vertices in S have outgoing edges destined for vertices in S and no
winner can be declared. Characterizing all sample mechanisms is an outstanding open
problem. We are able to provide a first step, by providing a characterization for the class
of strong sample mechanisms. Informally, in such mechanisms, vertices cannot affect
their chance of being selected in the sample set S.
Definition 1. (Strong sample mechanisms) We call a sample mechanism (g, f) with
sample function g : G1 → P(N) strong, if g(x′u,x−u) = g(x) for all u ∈ g(x),
x′u ∈ N \ {u} and x ∈ G1.
The reader may observe the similarity of this definition with impartiality (function g
of a strong sample mechanism satisfies similar properties with function f of an impartial
selection mechanism). The following lemma describes a straightforward, yet useful,
consequence of the above definition.
Lemma 3. Let (g, f) be a strong sample mechanism and let S ⊆ N . For any nomina-
tion profiles x,x′ with x−S = x′−S , if S \ g(x) 6= ∅ then S \ g(x′) 6= ∅.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that S \ g(x′) = ∅, i.e., the sample
vertices in x′ are disjoint from S. Then, by Definition 1, g(x) remains the same as
outgoing edges from vertices in S should not affect the sample set. But then, S \g(x) =
∅, which is a contradiction. uunionsq
In the next theorem, we provide a characterization of the sample function of im-
partial strong sample mechanisms. The theorem essentially states that the only possible
way to choose the sample set must be independent of the graph.
5 For simplicity we use the notation (g, f) rather the more precise (g, f(g)).
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Theorem 3. Any impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism (g, f) selects the
sample set independently of the nomination profile, i.e., for all x,x′ ∈ G1, g(x) =
g(x′) = S.
Proof. Consider any sample mechanism (g, f) and any nomination profile x ∈ G1.
It suffices to show that for any vertex u, and any deviation x′u, the sample set must
remain the same, i.e., g(x′u,x−u, ) = g(x). If u ∈ g(x), this immediately follows by
Definition 1. In the following, we prove two claims that this is also true when u /∈ g(x);
Claim 2 treats the case where u is a winner of a profile, while Claim 3 treats the case
where u is a not a winner.
Claim 2. Let (g, f) be an impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism and let x
be a nomination profile. Then the sample set must remain the same for any other vote
of the winner, i.e., g(x) = g(x′f(x),x−f(x)) for any x
′
f(x) ∈ N \ f(x).
have
Proof. Let w = f(x) be the winner, for some nomination profile x. We will prove the
claim by induction on δ(w,x).
(Base case: δ(w,x) = 1) Let S = g(x) be the sample set for profile x. Assume
for the sake of contradiction that when w changes its vote to x′w, the sample for profile
x′ = (x′w,x−w) changes, i.e., g(x
′) = S′ 6= S. We first note that impartiality of f
implies that w = f(x′). Next, observe that the vertex voting for w in S must be also in
S′; otherwise, w becomes a winner without getting any vote from the sample set, which
contradicts our definition of sample mechanisms. We will show that this must be the
case for all vertices in S.
To do this, we will expand two parallel branches, creating a series of nomination
profiles starting from x and x′ which will eventually lead to contradiction. Figure 1
depicts the situation for x and x′.
a b
w
s s′
(a) profile x
a b
w
s s′
(b) profile x′
Fig. 1: The starting profiles x and x′ in Claim 2. Red denotes the winner, while green
dashed vertices denote the members of the sample sets S and S′, respectively.
We start with the profile x′. Consider a vertex s′ ∈ S′ \ S. We create a profile z′
in which all vertices in S′ \ s′ vote for s′ (i.e., zv = s′, for each v ∈ S′ \ s′), vertex
s′ votes for w (i.e., zv = w), while the rest of the vertices vote as in x′ (i.e., zv = xv ,
for each v 6∈ S′). For illustration, see Figures 2a and 2b. By the definition of a strong
sample mechanism, we obtain g(z′) = g(x′), since only votes of vertices in S′ have
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changed. Notice also that f(z′) = w, as this is the only vertex outside S′ that receives
votes from S′. We now move to profile x and apply the same sequence of deviations,
involving all the vertices in S′. These lead to the profile z, which differs from z′ only
in the outgoing edge of vertex w.
a b
w
s s′
(a) profile z
a b
w
s s′
(b) profile z′
a b
w
s s′ v
(c) profile y
a b
w
s s′ v
(d) profile y′
Fig. 2: Profiles z and z′ in the base case of the proof of Claim 2: Red denotes the winner,
while green dashed vertices denote the members of the sample sets S and S′. A red solid
diamond denotes a vertex that cannot win and a green/light diamond denotes a vertex
that cannot be in the sample.
By Lemma 3, there is a vertex v ∈ S′ such that v /∈ g(z). If v = s′, then we end up
in a contradiction. This is because f(z) 6= w, since s′ is the only vertex voting for w in
z′ and s′ is not in the sample, while f(z′) = w, as stated by the other branch and since,
when w deviates to x′w, the created profile is (x
′
w, z−w) = z
′ contradicting impartiality
(see Figures 2a and 2b).
We are now left with the case where s′ ∈ g(z) and v 6= s′. Starting from z and z′,
we will create profiles y and y′ (see Figures 2c and 2d) as follows: we construct y by
letting s′ vote towards v (i.e., ys′ = v), v vote towards w (i.e., yv = w) and yi = zi for
all other vertices i 6= v, s′. By the strong sample property, when s′ votes towards v the
sample set is preserved, i.e., v cannot get in the sample. Also, when v votes, v cannot
get in the sample (by a trivial application of Lemma 3); therefore, v 6∈ g(y). Hence, w
cannot be the winner as its only incoming vote is from v, a vertex that does not belong
to the sample set g(y).
Starting from z′, we create similarly y′ by letting s′ vote towards v (y′s′ = v), v to
vote towards w (y′v = w) and y
′
i = zi for all other vertices i 6= v, s′. In this case, S′
will be preserved as sample set in profile y′ (i.e. g(y′) = S′). Therefore, w is the only
vertex voted by the sample set and must be the winner, leading to a contradiction (see
Figures 2c and 2d).
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(Induction step) Assume as induction hypothesis that, for all profiles x ∈ G1,
it holds g(x) = g(x′w,x−w) when δ(w,x) ≤ λ, for some λ ≥ 1. Now, consider any
profile xwhere f(x) = w and δ(w,x) = λ+1 and assume for the sake of contradiction
that there is some graph x′ = (x′w,x−w) where g(x
′) = S′ 6= S. Without loss of
generality, let δS(w,x) ≤ δS′(w,x′).
Starting from x′, we create profile z′, by letting all vertices in S′ vote for some
s′ ∈ S′ and s′ vote for w, i.e., z′v = s′ for each vertex v ∈ S′ \ {s′} and z′s′ = w. The
strong sample property implies that g(z′) = S′ and f(z′) = w. We focus now on profile
x, and create the profile z, by performing the same series of deviations, i.e., by letting
all vertices in S′ \ s′ vote for s′ and s′ vote for w. Note, here, that z differs from z′ only
in the outgoing edge of w. Like before, Lemma 3 establishes that there will be some
vertex v ∈ S′ such that v /∈ g(z), i.e., g(z) 6= S′. Turning our attention back to z′, we let
w deviate towards xw, creating profile (xw, z′−w). Observe that (xw, z
′
−w) = z. Since
δ(w, z′) < δ(w,x), by the induction hypothesis we have g(z) = S′, a contradiction.
uunionsq
The next claim establishes the remaining case, where no vertex u 6∈ g(x), u 6= f(x)
can change the sample set.
Claim 3. Let (g, f) be an impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism, x be a
nomination profile and u a vertex with u 6∈ g(x), u 6= f(x). Then g(x) = g(x′u,x−u)
for any other vote x′u ∈ N \ u.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists some nomination profile
x′ = (x′u,x−u) with g(x
′) = S′ 6= S. Starting from x′, we define a profile z′ in which
all vertices in S′ vote for u, and the rest vote as in x′. That is, z′v = u, for all v ∈ S′
and z′v = x
′
v otherwise. Clearly f(z
′) = u, as all the sample vertices vote for u. By
Claim 2, we know that g(xu, z′−u) = g(z
′) = S′.
Starting from x, we define a profile z in which all vertices in S′ vote for u, and the
rest vote as in x. Since S′ 6= S = g(x), by Lemma 3, we get g(z) 6= S′. Observe that
z = (xu, z
′
−u), which leads to a contradiction. uunionsq
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. uunionsq
We next use Theorem 3 to obtain lower bounds on the additive approximation guar-
antee obtained by deterministic and randomized strong sample mechanisms respec-
tively.
Corollary 1. There is no impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism with addi-
tive approximation better than n− 2.
Proof. Let S be the sample set which, by Theorem 3, must be selected independently
of x, and let v ∈ S. Define x so that all vertices inN \v vote for v and all other vertices
have in-degree either 0 or 1. Then, ∆(x) = n− 1, but the mechanism selects vertex xv
of in-degree exactly 1. uunionsq
We remark that the strong sample mechanism that uses a specific vertex as singleton
sample achieves this additive approximation guarantee.
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We next provide a lower bound on the additive approximation guarantee of ran-
domized strong sample mechanisms, which shows that RANDOM k-SAMPLE (with
k = Θ(
√
n); see Section 3.1) is an optimal mechanism from this class.
Corollary 2. There is no impartial randomized strong sample mechanism with additive
approximation better than Ω(
√
n).
Proof. By Theorem 3, any impartial deterministic strong sample mechanism selects its
sample S independently of the graph. Hence, any impartial randomized strong sample
mechanism decides its sample with a probability distribution over all possible sample
sets S ⊆ N , independently of the graph. We examine two cases for this probability
distribution.
If there is a vertex u∗ withPr [ v ∈ S ] ≥ 1/√n, then consider a nomination profile
consisting of vertex u∗ having maximum in-degree∆ = n−1 (i.e., all other vertices are
pointing to it), with all other vertices having in-degree either 1 or 0. Since u∗ belongs
to the sample (and, hence, cannot be the winner) with probability at least 1/
√
n, the
expected degree of the winner is at most 1 + (n− 1)(1− 1/√n) = ∆−Θ(√n).
Otherwise, assume that every vertex v has probability at most 1/
√
n of being se-
lected in the sample set. Consider a nomination profile with a vertex u∗ having maxi-
mum degree ∆ =
√
n/2 and all other vertices having in-degree either 0 or 1. Consider
a vertex u pointing to vertex u∗. The probability that u belongs to the sample is at
most 1/
√
n. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that some of the
√
n/2 vertices
pointing to u∗ is selected in the sample set is at most 1/2. Hence, the probability that
u∗ is returned as the winner is not higher than 1/2 and the expected in-degree of the
winner is at most 1 +
√
n/2 · 1/2 = ∆−Θ(√n). uunionsq
4.2 General Lower Bound
Our last result is a lower bound for all deterministic impartial mechanisms in the most
general model of Alon et al. [1], where each agent can nominate multiple other agents
or even abstain. We remark that our current proof applies to mechanisms that always
select a winner. Due to space limitations we refer the reader to the full version of the
paper for the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. There is no impartial deterministic α-additive mechanism for α ≤ 2.
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